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UNION POWER TO FINE
we noted at the outset, that atmosphere has been purified through
injections of egalitarian vapors. Today, the court's actions are
complemented by other agencies both state" and federal" which
have been commissioned to eliminate discrimination in all its
ugly forms, and to do so by policing the daily interactions of
workers, unions, and their employers. The increasing pressures
from private civil rights organizations, noted in the instant case,
complement the governmental activity. These agencies and organ-
izations can do much to insure that what starts as grudging compli-
ance will eventually blossom into cooperation and that unions and
employers who are on the verge of tidying up their own practices
will do so without the need for formal intervention. The experi-
ence in the educational sector demonstrates that with concerted ef-
forts progress can be made in eliminating discrimination but that
the way will be fraught with frustration and delay.
THoMAs B. ACKLAND
LABOR LAW - LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT -
UNION POWER TO FINE MEMBERS FOR OVERWORKING
Scofield v. NLRB, 37 U.S.L.W. 4276 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1969).
At its inception, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 1
was intended to provide an atmosphere in which the labor unions
could develop as viable bargaining representatives.2 To effectuate
this purpose, it was necessary to restrict the overpowering influence
and control management exerted over the individual worker.' Un-
der the NLRA unions developed as powerful bargaining agents.4
As a consequence of this increased union power, the need arose to
protect against union violation of the rights of the union members.5
Thus, Congress amended the NLRA in order to delineate the rights
of the employee with regard to his union membership' and to re-
strict the union's ability to interfere with the exercise of those
4sSee Jenkins, supra note 3, at 281, for a rather pessimistic appraisal of the pros-
pects for a significant contribution from these state agencies.
49 See note 11 supra. Because of the unique suitability of discrimination problems
to agency rather than judicial control, it can only be hoped that Congress will strengthen
the powers of the EEOC so that that body can press forward more efficiently the cause
of equality of opportunity.
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rights.7  The Supreme Court's recent decision in Scofield v. NLRB,8
particularly in view of the Court's 1967 decision in NLRB v. Allis-
129 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964) [hereinafter cited as NLRAI.
2 Congressional findings and policies are succinctly set forth in section 1 of the
NLRA which provides in part:
Experience has proven that protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, im-
pairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing
certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising
out of differences as to wages, hours, or working conditions, and by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees. NLRA
§ 1, id. § 151.
a See NLRA § 8(a), id. § 158(a) where the employer's unfair labor practices are
delineated.
4 Between 1935 and 1947 union membership tripled, passing the 15,000,000 mark
in 1947. The impact upon the public was widely felt as a result of the large number of
strikes during this period. These strikes stemmed primarily from the young, militant,
inexperienced unions asserting their newly realized strength at the bargaining table.
See R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 41-48 (4th ed. 1968).
5 The need is best illustrated by the comments of Senators Taft and Ball in their
presentation of the 1947 amendments. Both the additional rights granted to employ-
ees in section 7 and the correlative restrictions imposed upon the unions in section 8(b),
were a result of the unions' abuse of the power granted to them under the original
NLRA. Senator Ball pointed out several of an increasing number of National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) cases which accused unions of engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1944) (absolutely false state-
ment in a pre-election campaign that the CIO affiliated unions were not recognized by
the NLRB, held not ground to set aside the election); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 N.L.R.B.
795 (1942) (union in pre-election campaign falsely stated that it was exempt from the
no-strike pledge given by the President during the war, held not a ground on which the
election could be set aside). In these instances, had the employer made similar state-
ments, he would have been guilty of coercing employees in their free choice of a bar-
gaining agent. See 93 CONG. REc. 4016 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball). It is clear
from the Senators' comments that there was a need to place restrictions upon unions
similar to those placed upon employers in the 1935 Act.
6 Section 7 sets forth the rights of the employees:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be aflected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) (emphasis added to indicate the portions
added by the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) which amended the
NLRA).
7 Section 8(b) was inserted to delineate the correlative restrictions upon the union.
It provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... (1) to restrain
or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organ-
ization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein .... NLRA § 8(b) (1) (A), id. § 158 (b) (1) (A).
8 37 U.S.L.W. 4276 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1969).
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Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,9 precipitates the need to clarify the
precise interrelationship of these two concepts.
In Allis-Chalmers a union rule forbidding union members from
crossing the picket line during a strike was challenged as constituting
a violation of the members' right to refrain from participating in con-
certed activities.10  The Supreme Court,11 reasoning that the by-law
was a proper regulation of the union's internal affairs, held that since
the rule was duly adopted and was not the arbitrary fiat of a union
officer, it was enforceable against voluntary union members by expul-
sion or reasonable fine."2 In Scofield a collective bargaining agree-
ment gave the employees the unrestricted right to earn and immedi-
ately collect wages in excess of the guaranteed or hourly machine
rate. 3 A union by-law, however, -imposed a ceiling on the amount
of wages each member could receive. If a member earned amounts
above the ceiling, the by-law required that he bank these excess
earnings with the company. 14  A member violated the by-law if 'he
demanded immediate payment of earnings in excess of the ceiling,
or if his average earnings exceeded the ceiling rate when his banked
amounts were returned. In 1961 six union members demanded and
received immediate payment for earnings above the ceiling. They
were charged with conduct unbecoming union members and fined
following union trials.' 5 The members filed charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that the union ac-
tion had restrained and coerced them in the exercise of their section
7 right to refrain from participating in concerted union activities.' 6
In a split decision the Board dismissed the complaint finding no un-
0 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
10 See note 6 supra.
11 The Court split 4-1-4 and there was no unified majority. Mr. Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice White concurred separately. Mr. Justice Black
was joined in dissent by Messrs. Justices Douglas, Harlan and Stewart.
12 388 U.S. at 195.
13 Russell Scofield, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1118 (1964).
14 In order to bank his excess wages, the employee was required to keep an account
of his amount of excess work and report to the company where bookkeeping entries
were made for the amounts earned above the ceilings. At a later date, when, for some
reason, the employee could not work up to the production ceiling, he would draw upon
his banked wages to make up the difference. See Russell Scofield, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097,
1117 (1964).
15 The fines imposed ranged from $50 to $100. Two of the six members paid
their fines. The union filed suit to collect the fines from the other four in the Civil
Court of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. The suit is still pending. Similar suits have
allowed the unions to recover the fines under a contract theory. See Local 248, UAW
v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237 (1967); Local 756, UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528 (1958).
1ONLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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fair labor practice,"1 and the seventh circuit affirmed the Board.'8
The Supreme Court, holding 7-1'" that the union rule vindicated
a legitimate union interest, and contravened no policy of the
NLRA,2 ° reasoned that the by-law was a proper regulation of the
union's internal affairs.2
In comparing Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, it is important to real-
ize that the right to strike is a fundamental concept to a union's exist-
ence22 because a union which is unable to use a strike for leverage
loses its efficacy as a collective bargaining unit. In Allis-Chalmers
the members' attempt to exert their section 7 rights represented a
frontal assault upon the union's power to effectually maintain its
position as a bargaining agent. Since the purpose of the NLRA was
to enable unions to develop as viable bargaining representatives,23
the Court was justified in finding ,that the collection of union fines
was a proper regulation of internal union affairs because it consti-
tuted an attempt to preserve the union's bargaining status. In Sco-
field the union members argued that the union, rather than enter-
taining an interest in preserving its bargaining position, was circum-
venting the negotiation process by using internal union regulation to
recoup benefits it failed to derive from collective bargaining. The
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the ceiling rate, though
fixed by the union, was indirectly involved in union-management
negotiations on the machine rate,24 and that the employer had ac-
quiesced in the union rule by failing to bargain for union abandon-
ment of the rule.25 More significantly, the Court held that since
17 Russell Scofield, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964) (split decision, one member dis-
senting and one concurring in separate opinion).
1 8 Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968).
19 Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Black dissented. Mr.
Justice Marshall took no part in the decision.
20 37 U.S.L.W. at 4280.
21 Id. at 4279.
22 The Court is very sensitive to the preservation of the right to strike. The Court's
regard of the strike as fundamental to a union's bargaining status is illustrated in NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), in which the Court said:
This repeated solicitude for the right to strike is predicated upon the conclu-
sion that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which
in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bar-
gaining system.
While Congress has from time to time revamped and redirected national
labor policy, its concern for the integrity of the strike weapon has remained
constant. Thus when Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did
so by prescribing the limits in exacting detail .... Id., at 233-34 (foomotes
omitted).
23 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
24 37 U.S.L.W. at 4279.
25 Id. The Court further cited the company's cooperation in the administration of
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such regulations advanced historically legitimate union interests, the
union was justified in -imposing the ceiling on its members' incen-
tive pay earnings:26
However, assuming that production ceilings derive from tradi-
tional union interests, 27 there remains the more important question of
whether these work limitations are internal affairs within the proviso
of section 8(b) (1) (A) which protects the union in its right "to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect -to -the acquisition or retention of
membership therein."28  The Court in Allis-Chalmers, distinguishing
between internal and external union regulation, held that Congress
proposed no limitations with respect to -the internal affairs of unions,
but specifically barred enforcement of a union's internal regulations
to affect a member's status as an employee of the company.29 Thus,
a union by-law regulating the conduct of its members during a strike
involves primarily the relationship between the union member and
his union.30 Production ceilings, 'however, cannot be characterized
as purely internal union affairs concerning only the member's status
within the union. Rather, ceilings are a condition of employment
directly effecting all three entities of the employment relationship -
the union, the member-employee, and the employer .3 Thus, it seems
the rule by keeping the books and honoring requests by employees to bank their pay
for over-ceiling work.2 0 Production ceilings are a traditional union goal serving as a counterpart to
management-imposed incentive pay systems. Unions favor ceilings and contend that
they (1) prevent employees from working themselves out of jobs, (2) limit the
amount of jealousies among the workers, (3) keep a greater number of workers on the
job, and (4) prevent health hazards incurred from over-working or being under too
much pressure to produce. Employers naturally dislike work limitations because they
can prevent an individual employee from producing as much as he wishes. Work
limitations can also amount to work "slow-downs" and in many instances create a situa-
tion where the employer is actually financing a work stoppage. Although ceilings have
been judicially criticized, they have been traditionally recognized as valid terms of col-
lective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136 N.J. Eq.
172, 176, 41 A.2d 32, 34 (Ch. 1945); In re Ampco Metal, Inc. and Employees' Mut.
Benefit Ass'n, 16 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1569 (1945); In re Ford Motor Co. and United Auto
Workers (CIO), 14 Lab. Rel. Rep. 2625 (1944). See generally S. SLICHTER, UNION
POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT (1941); Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951).
27See S. SLICHTER, supra note 26, at 315-28.
28 See note 7 supra.
29 388 U.S. at 195.
a0 By virtue of the position of the union in the employment relationship, every
union rule will have some effect upon the employer. Thus, the distinction becomes one
of degree of effect. In Allis-Chalmers this effect is negligible.
31 This distinction becomes critical since the Allis-Chalmers decision relies so heav-
ily on protecting the union's right to regulate its internal affairs. See 388 U.S. at 195.
The scope of the term "internal affairs" must be defined for a clear resolution of Scofield.
It is submitted that conditions of employment, such as production ceilings, clearly fall
outside the internal affairs concept
1969]
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that Scofield is outside the Allis-Chalmers rationale. Mr. Justice
White, conceding that -the rule "[had] and was intended to have
an impact beyond the confines of the union organization, ' 32 stated
that this alone did not render the rule in violation of section 8 (b) (1)
(A) . 3  Extracting the broadest possible interpretation of Allis-
Chalmers, he held that even when the union rule goes beyond the
confines of internal regulation it is valid "unless some impairment of
a statutory labor policy can be shown." 34 However, even under this
reading of the Allis-Chalmers rule, it is arguable that the union's
actions in Scofield are violative of the strictures of this test. The
Scofield Court reasoned that the employer, rather than acquiescing
to the union's rule, should have pressed the issue to impasse at the
bargaining table following up with a strike or lockout." The effect
is to shift a fundamental burden from the union to the employer. In-
stead of requiring the union to press for acceptance of the production
ceiling at the negotiations, the employer now bears the formidable
responsibility of using his economic weapons to force the union to
abandon its use of the work limitation. This peculiar result seems to
reflect the judiciary's attempt to further increase the power of organ-
ized labor. More important, the Court's suggestion that the employ-
er's proper alternative is to use his economic weapons contravenes
a fundamental purpose of the act - to promote peaceful settlement
of industrial disputes and avoid all possibilities of industrial strife. 6
The peculiar facts of Scofield probably justify the Court's decision,
since the employer's conduct during the 25 year existence of the
union rule convincingly indicates acquiescence. Thus, in condoning
the union regulation, the possible disruptive effects upon the indus-
trial community are minimal.
32 37 U.S.L.W. at 4279.
33 Id.
34 Id. See, e.g., Industrial Union Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 159 N.L.R.B.
1065 (1966); Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
In both Skura and Marine W~orkers, the Board was concerned with union rules re-
quiring a member to exhaust union remedies before filing an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board. In the Board's view, that rule frustrated the enforcement scheme es-
tablished by the statute. The union would commit an unfair labor practice by fining
oz expelling members who violated the rule. The Marine WVorkers case came before
the Supreme Court which upheld the Board's ruling and agreed that the rule in question
was contrary to the Act's policy of keeping employees completely free from coercion
against making complaints to the Board. Frustrating this policy was beyond the legiti-
mate interest of the labor organization, at least when the member's complaint concerned
conduct of the employer as well as the union. See NLRB v. Industrial Union Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
35 37 U.S.L.W. at 4274.
3 6 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
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There remains, however, the consideration of the most important
individual in the -tripartite employment relationship, the employee-
union member. Section 7 of the NLRA37 grants workers the right
to refrain from participating in any or all concerted union activities."8
The union members in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield sought -to
assert this right against the unions' by-laws, and in both instances
their rights were swept aside. There can be no doubt that the unions'
actions in both cases represent concerted activities. Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting for the same reasons in both cases, 39 proposed that a literal
reading of section 7 can only lead -to the result that these workers
are guaranteed the right to choose to refrain from participating in the
strike or the production ceiling. The majority in Allis-Chalmers dis-
counted this right in light of the over-riding policy considerations
supporting -the right to strike.40  In light of -those considerations, the
ruling there seems justifiable and necessary. The Scofield Court,
rather than balancing competing policy considerations, -indicated that
the Court ,is now focusing on the concept of voluntary versus invol-
untary union membership. The Court reasoned that the Scofield
employees joined the union in the face of the alternative of leaving
the union and obtaining whatever 'benefits may result from working
without a production ceiling.41 This suggests the curious conclusion
that when a worker joins a union, he surrenders his section 7 rights
to refrain. Pure logic, however, seems to necessitate a contrary result.
The Act not only gives the employee the choice of joining or not
joining, but gives him the right to be a "good, bad, or indifferent"
union member. 42  It cannot fairly be said that by joining the union
one forfeits all rights expressly given him by the Act, when the
37 See note 6 supra.
38 Id.
39 388 U.S. at 199; 37 U.S.L.W. at 4280. Mr. Justice Black regards the section 7
guarantee as absolute and considers any court-enforced union fine coercive when the
alternative of expulsion from membership exists. Although based on what he regards
as the plain meaning of the Act, this view ignores the practical effect of providing the
union with a meaningless tool - a strike with no participants. One cannot read cer-
tain sections of the Act and not consider each in light of the overall scope and purpose.
The Act sought to provide the union with a viable seat at the bargaining table. To
enhance the persuasiveness of its position, the union was guaranteed the right to strike.
Although the NLRA does not guarantee the union the right to receive total member-
ship participation, it does secure the union with the right to regulate its own internal
affairs. To read section 7 as permitting non-participation in lawful strikes works de-
struction on the existence of the union and the overall purpose of the Act.
40 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
41 37 U.S.L.W. at 4280.
4Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
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NLRA was presumably structured to allow him to join the union
without the fear of losing those rights. In any event, membership
cannot be said to be truly voluntary in Scofield because the employee
had to either join the union or pay a service fee equivalent to dues.
Moreover, even where there is no such agreement, the fact that a
union may become the bargaining representative for an employee
against his wishes, puts great practical pressure upon the employee
to join the union in order to have a voice (as small as it may be) in
his own terms and conditions of employment.4"
Thus, rather than totally discounting the employees rights when
he voluntarily joins the union, the most workable solution would
seem to be a balancing approach which considers: the union member's
rights as an individual employee; the union's need to protect its posi-
tion as an effective bargaining agent; and the need to further the
overall scope and purpose of the Act. In applying the test of Allis-
Chalmers, the interests of the union as a whole and the purpose of
the Act weigh more heavily than the right of the individual employee
to refrain from participating in the strike. In Scofield, on the other
hand, the -interests weigh differently. While the NLRA provides an
atmosphere in which the union can effectively bargain, it does not
guarantee that every union demand will be met at the bargaining
table.44  The union in Scofield, unable -to attain its desired goals at
the bargaining table, chose to impose its own work limitations. For
section 7 to be meaningful, the employee's right to refrain should
weigh more heavily than the corresponding interest of the union.
While the peculiar fact patterns in both cases probably justify
the conclusions reached, it is submitted that these decisions should not
be read as establishing broad rules to be liberally interpreted in the
future.45 Union rules similar to those in Scofield have been struck
4 For a discussion of this issue, see Comment, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1966); Re-
cent Decision, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 221 (1967).
44 An understanding of this differentiation is essential. In the declaration of pur-
pose and policies, the Act is clear in indicating its concern for the unions and their in-
ability to deal on an equal par with management. The Act seeks to provide an atmos-
phere in which the union, through its own initiative, can develop as a viable bargaining
agent. The Act goes no further. It is the responsibility of the union to develop allegi-
ance among its members and to assert itself through its own experience as a persuasive
force at the bargaining table. See NLRA § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
45 If the union believed the ceiling rule to be an implied term of the collective bar-
gaining contract, one wonders why the union did not proceed against the employer un-
der section 301 of the LMRA to enforce the contract. Id. § 185(a). This would seem
to be a more effective approach than fining the individual employees. Section 301
provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the
